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Abstract—Rather than anonymizing social graphs by gener-
alizing them to super nodes/edges or adding/removing nodes
and edges to satisfy given privacy parameters, recent methods
exploit the semantics of uncertain graphs to achieve privacy
protection of participating entities and their relationship. These
techniques anonymize a deterministic graph by converting it
into an uncertain form. In this paper, we propose a generalized
obfuscation model based on uncertain adjacency matrices that
keep expected node degrees equal to those in the unanonymized
graph. We analyze two recently proposed schemes and show their
fitting into the model. We also point out disadvantages in each
method and present several elegant techniques to fill the gap
between them. Finally, to support fair comparisons, we develop
a new tradeoff quantifying framework by leveraging the concept
of incorrectness in location privacy research. Experiments on
large social graphs demonstrate the effectiveness of our schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Graphs represent a rich class of data observed in daily life
where entities are described by vertices and their connections
are characterized by edges. With the emergence of increasingly
complex networks [11], the research community requires large
and reliable graph data to conduct in-depth studies. However,
this requirement usually conflicts with privacy rights of data
contributing entities. Naive approaches like removing user ids
from a social graph are not effective, leaving users open
to privacy risks, especially re-identification attacks [1] [7].
Therefore, many graph anonymization schemes have been
proposed [24], [9], [25], [4], [20], [18].
Given an unlabeled undirected graph, the existing
anonymization methods fall into four main categories. The
first category includes random addition, deletion and switching
of edges to prevent the re-identification of nodes or edges.
The methods in the second category provide k-anonymity
[17] by deterministic edge additions or deletions, assuming
attacker’s background knowledge regarding certain properties
of its target nodes. The methods in the third category assign
edge probabilities to add uncertainty to the true graph. The
edges probabilities may be computed explicitly as in [2] or
implicitly via random walks [10]. Finally, the fourth class of
techniques, generalization, cluster nodes into super nodes of
size at least k. Note that the last two classes of schemes induce
possible world models, i.e., we can retrieve sample graphs that
are consistent with the anonymized output graph.
The third category is the most recent class of methods
which leverage the semantics of edge probability to inject
uncertainty to a given deterministic graph, converting it into an
uncertain one. Most of schemes in this category are scalable,
i.e. runnable on million-scale graphs or more. As an example,
Boldi et al. [2] introduced the concept of (k,ǫ)-obfuscation
(denoted as (k, ǫ)-obf), where k ≥ 1 is a desired level of
obfuscation and ǫ ≥ 0 is a tolerance parameter. However,
the pursuit for minimum standard deviation σ in (k,ǫ)-obf has
high impact on node privacy and high privacy-utility tradeoff.
Edge rewiring method based on random walks (denoted as
RandWalk) in [10] also introduces uncertainty to edges as
we show in section IV. This scheme suffers from high lower
bounds for utility despite its excellent privacy-utility tradeoff.
Motivated by (k,ǫ)-obf and RandWalk, we propose in this
work a generalized model for anonymizing graphs based on
edge uncertainty. Both (k,ǫ)-obf and RandWalk display their
fitting into the model. We point out disadvantages in (k,ǫ)-obf
and RandWalk, the tradeoff gap between them and present
several elegant techniques to fill this gap. Finally, to support
fair comparisons, we develop a new tradeoff quantifying
framework using the concept of incorrectness in location
privacy research [15].
Our contributions are summarized as follows:
• We propose a generalized model called uncertain adja-
cency matrix for anonymizing graph via edge uncertainty
semantics (Section IV). The key property of this model
is that expected degrees of all nodes must be unchanged.
We show the fitting of (k,ǫ)-obf and RandWalk into the
model and then analyze their disadvantages (Sections III,
IV).
• We introduce the Maximum Variance (MaxVar) scheme
(Section V) that satisfies all the properties of the uncertain
adjacency matrix. It achieves good privacy-utility tradeoff
by using two key observations: nearby potential edges and
maximization of total node degree variance via a simple
quadratic program.
• Towards a fair comparison for anonymization schemes
on graphs, this paper describes a generic quantifying
framework (Section VI) by putting forward the distortion
measure (also called incorrectness in [15]) to measure the
re-identification risks of nodes. As for the utility score,
typical graph metrics [2] [21] are chosen.
• We conduct a comparative study of aforementioned ap-
proaches on three real large graphs and show the effec-
tiveness of our gap-filling solutions (Section VII).
Table I summarizes notations used in this paper.
TABLE I: List of notations
Symbol Definition
G0 = (V,EG0) true graph with n = |V | and m = |EG0 |
G = (V,E, p) uncertain graph constructed from G0
G = (V,EG) sample graph from G, G ⊑ G
du(G), du(G) degree of node u in G,G
∆(d) number of nodes having degree d in G
N (u) neighbors of node u in G
Rσ truncated normal distribution on [0,1]
re ← Rσ a sample from the distribution Rσ
pi (puv) probability of edge ei (euv)
np number of potential edges, |E| = m+ np
A, A adjacency matrices of G0, G
PRW random walk transition matrix of G0
B(t) uncertain adjacency matrix, B(t) = AP t−1RW
t walk length
S switching matrix
TV total degree variance
II. RELATED WORK
A. Anonymizing Deterministic Graphs
There is a vast literature on graph perturbation that deserves
a survey. In this section, we enumerate only several groups of
ideas that are related to our proposed schemes.
1) Anonymizing unlabeled vertices for node privacy: In
unlabeled graphs, node identifiers are numbered in an arbitrary
manner after removing their labels. An attacker aims at rei-
dentifying nodes solely based on their structural information.
For this line of graphs, node privacy protection implies link
privacy. Techniques of adding and removing edges, nodes can
be done randomly or deterministically. Random perturbation is
a naive approach and usually used as a baseline method. More
guided approaches consist of k-neighborhood[24], k-degree[9],
k-automorphism[25], k-symmetry[20], k-isomorphism[4] and
k2-degree[18]. These schemes provide k-anonymity [17] se-
mantics and usually rely on heuristics to avoid combina-
torial intractability. K-automorphism, k-symmetry, and k-
isomorphism can resist any structural attacks by exploiting
the inherent symmetry in graph. k2-degree addresses the
friendship attacks, based on the vertex degree pair of an edge.
Ying and Wu [21] propose a spectrum preserving approach
which wisely chooses edge pairs to switch in order to keep
the spectrum of the adjacency matrix not to vary too much.
The clearest disadvantage of the above schemes is that they
are inefficient on large scale graphs.
Apart from the two above categories, perturbation tech-
niques have other categories that settle on possible world
semantics. Hay et al. [7] generalize a network by clustering
nodes and publish graph summarization of super nodes and
super edges. The utility of this scheme is limited. On the other
hand, Boldi et al. [2] take the uncertain graph approach. With
edge probabilities, the output graph can be used to generate
sample graphs by independent edge sampling. Our approach
belongs to this class of techniques with different formulation
and better privacy-utility tradeoff. Note that in k-symmetry[4],
the output sample graphs are also possible worlds of the
symmetric intermediate graph.
2) Anonymizing labeled vertices for link privacy: If nodes
are labeled, we are only concerned about the link disclosure
risk. For example, Mittal et al. [10] employ an edge rewiring
method based on random walks to keep the mixing time tun-
able and prevent link re-identification by Bayesian inference.
This method is effective for social network based systems, e.g.
Sybil defense, DHT routing. Link privacy is also described
in [21] for Random Switch, Random Add/Del. Interestingly,
RandWalk [10] can also be used for unlabeled graphs as shown
in Section IV.
3) Min entropy, Shannon entropy and incorrectness mea-
sure: We now survey commonly used notions of privacy
metrics. Min entropy [16] quantifies the largest probability
gap between the posterior and prior over all items in the
input dataset. K-anonymity has the same semantics with the
corresponding min entropy of log2 k. So we say k-anonymity
based perturbation schemes belong to min entropy. Shannon
entropy argued in [3] and [2] is another choice of privacy
metrics. The third metrics that we use in this paper is the
incorrectness measure from location privacy [15]. Given the
prior information (e.g. node degree in the true graph) and the
posterior information harvested from the anonymized output,
incorrectness measure is the number of incorrect guesses made
by the attacker. This measure gauges the distortion caused by
the anonymization algorithm.
B. Mining Uncertain Graphs
Uncertain graphs pose big challenges to traditional mining
techniques. Because of the exponential number of possible
worlds, naive enumerations are intractable. Typical graph
search operations like k-Nearest neighbor and pattern match-
ing require new approaches [13] [26] [23]. Those methods
answer threshold-based queries by using pruning strategies
based on Apriori property of frequent patterns.
III. PRELIMINARIES
This section starts with definitions and common assump-
tions on uncertain graphs. It then analyzes vulnerabilities in
(k, ǫ)-obf [2].
A. Uncertain Graph
Let G = (V,E, p) be an uncertain undirected graph, where
p : E → [0, 1] is the function that gives an existence
probability to each edge (see Fig.1b). The common assumption
is on the independence of edge probabilities. Following the
possible-worlds semantics in relational data [5], the uncertain
graph G induces a set {G = (V,EG)} of 2|E| deterministic
graphs (worlds), each is defined by a subset of E. The
probability of G = (V,EG) ⊑ G is:
Pr(G) =
∏
e∈EG
p(e)
∏
e∈E\EG
(1− p(e)) (1)
Note that deterministic graphs are also uncertain graphs with
all edges having probabilities 1.
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Fig. 1: (a) True graph (b) An obfuscation with potential edges
(dashed) (c) Truncated normal distribution on [0,1] (bold solid
curves)
B. (k, ǫ)-obf and Its Limitations
In [2], Boldi et al. extend the concept of k-obfuscation
developed earlier [3].
Definition 3.1: (k,ǫ)-obf [2]. Let P be a vertex property,
k ≥ 1 be a desired level of obfuscation, and ǫ ≥ 0 be
a tolerance parameter. The uncertain graph G is said to
k-obfuscate a given vertex v ∈ G with respect to P if the
entropy of the distribution YP (v) over the vertices of G is
greater than or equal to log2 k:
H(YP (v)) ≥ log2 k (2)
The uncertain graph G is a (k, ǫ)-obf with respect to property
P if it k-obfuscates at least (1− ǫ)n vertices in G with respect
to P. 
Given the true graph G0 (Fig.1a), the basic idea of (k, ǫ)-
obf (Fig.1b) is to transfer the probabilities from existing edges
to potential (non-existing) edges to satisfy Definition 3.1. For
each existing sampled edge e, it is assigned a probability 1−re
where re ← Rσ (Fig. 1c) and for each non-existing sampled
edge e′, it is assigned a probability re′ ← Rσ .
Table II gives an example of how to compute degree entropy
for the uncertain graph in Fig. 1b. Here vertex property P
is the node degree. Each row in the left side is the degree
distribution for the corresponding node. For instance, v1 has
degree 0 with probability (1−0.8).(1−0.3).(1−0.9) = 0.014.
The right side normalizes values in each column (i.e. in each
degree value) to get distributions YP (v). The entropy H(YP (v))
for each degree value is shown in the bottom row. Given k =
3, log2 k = 1.585, then v1, v3 with true degree 2 and v2, v4
with true degree 1 satisfy (2). Therefore, ǫ = 0.
TABLE II: The degree uncertainty for each node (left) and
normalized values for each degree (right)
node degree uncertainty YP (v)
d=0 d=1 d=2 d=3 d=0 d=1 d=2 d=3
v1 .014 .188 .582 .216 .044 .117 .355 .491
v2 .210 .580 .210 .000 .656 .362 .128 .000
v3 .036 .252 .488 .224 .112 .158 .298 .509
v4 .060 .580 .360 .000 .187 .362 .220 .000
H 1.40 1.84 1.91 0.99
While (k, ǫ)-obf provides a novel technique to come up
with an uncertain version of the graph, the specific approach
(a) (b)
Fig. 2: (a) Semantics of selfloops (left), multi-selfloops (mid-
dle) and multiedges (right) in uncertain adjacency matrix (b)
Edge switching
in [2] has two drawbacks. First, it formulated the problem
as the minimization of σ. With small values of σ, re highly
concentrates around zero, so existing sampled edges have
probabilities nearly 1 and non-existing sampled edges are
assigned probabilities almost 0. By the simple rounding tech-
nique, the attacker can easily reveal the true graph. Even
if the graph owner only publishes sample graphs, the re-
identification attacks are still effective as we show in Section
VII. Note that in [2], the found values of σ vary in a wide
range from 10−1 to 10−8. Second, the approach in [2] does
not consider the locality (subgraph) of nodes in selecting
pairs of nodes for establishing potential edges. As shown in
[6], subgraph-wise perturbation effectively reduces structural
distortion.
IV. A GENERALIZED MODEL FOR UNCERTAIN GRAPH
This section introduces a generalized model of graph
anonymization via semantics of edge uncertainty. Then we
analyze several schemes using this model.
A. A Generalized Model: Uncertain Adjacency Matrix
Given the true graph G0, an uncertain graph G constructed
from G0 must have its uncertain adjacency matrix A satisfying
1) symmetry Aij = Aji
2) Aij ∈ [0, 1] and Aii = 0. If we relax this constraint to
(2’) allow Aii > 0 then we have selfloops and allow
Aij > 1 then we have multiedges (Fig. 2a).
3) expected degrees of all nodes must be unchanged. It
means
∑n
j=1Aij = di(G0) i = 1..n
We first define the transition matrix PRW which is right
stochastic (i.e. non-negative and row sums equal to 1) as
follows (note that we use the short notation di = di(G0))
PRW (i, j) =
{
1/di if (i, j) ∈ EG0 i 6= j
0 otherwise.
(3)
The power P tRW when t→∞ is P∞RW (i, j) = dj2m .
We prove two lemmas on properties of the products AP
and AP t where P is right stochastic.
Lemma 4.1: For an adjacency matrix A and a right stochas-
tic matrix P , the product AP is non-negative and has row
sums equal to those of A.
Proof: The non-negativity of AP is trivial. The sum of
row i of AP is ∑j(∑kAikPkj) = ∑kAik(∑j Pkj) =∑
kAik.1 =
∑
kAik
Lemma 4.2: For a deterministic graph G possessing adja-
cency matrix A and PRW , the product B(t) = AP t−1RW is also
symmetric.
Proof: We prove the result by induction. The case
t = 1 is trivial. We prove that for any t ≥ 2, B(t)ij =∑
pt(i,j)
∏
k∈pt(i,j),k 6=i,j 1/dk where pt(i, j) is a path of
length t from i to j.
When t = 2, B(2)ij =
∑
k AikPkj =
∑
(i,k),(k,j)∈E 1/dk,
so the result holds. Assuming that the result is correct up
to t − 1, i.e. B(t−1)ij =
∑
pt−1(i,j)
∏
k∈pt−1(i,j),k 6=i,j 1/dk.
Because B(t) = B(t−1)PRW , B
(t)
ij =
∑
l B
(t−1)
il Plj =∑
l,(l,j)∈E(
∑
pt−1(i,l)
∏
k∈pt−1(i,l),k 6=i,l 1/dk)1/dl =∑
pt(i,j)
∏
k∈pt(i,j),k 6=i,j 1/dk.
Because G is undirected, the set of all pt(i, j) is equal to
the set of all pt(j, i), so B(t)ij = B
(t)
ji .
We prove the uniqueness of PRW in the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 4.3: Given a deterministic graph G with adja-
cency matrix A, there exists one and only one right stochastic
matrix P that satisfies Puv = 0 for all (u, v) /∈ G and AP t is
symmetric for all t ≥ 0. The unique solution is P = PRW .
Proof: Lemma 4.2 shows that P = PRW satisfies Puv =
0 for all (u, v) /∈ G and AP t is symmetric for all t ≥ 0.
To prove that this is the unique solution, we repeat the
formula in the proof of Lemma 4.2. Let B(t) = AP t−1, then
B
(t)
ij =
∑
pt(i,j)
∏
k∈pt(i,j),k 6=i,j Pk,k+1 where k + 1 implies
the successive node of k in pt(i, j). Because B(t)ji has the same
number of products as B(t)ij (i.e. the number of paths of length
t), B(t) is symmetric if and only if corresponding products are
equal, i.e.
∏
k∈pt(i,j),k 6=i,j Pk,k+1 =
∏
k∈pt(j,i),k 6=i,j Pk,k+1.
At t = 2, for any path (i, k, j) we must have Pkj = Pki.
Along with the requirement that P is right stochastic, i.e.∑
i Pki = 1, we obtain Pki = 1/dk. This is exactly PRW .
B. RandWalk Approach
Now we apply the model of uncertain adjacency matrix to
the analysis of RandWalk [10]. Algorithm 1 depicts the steps
of RandWalk. As we show below, the trial-and-error condition
in Line 6 makes RandWalk hard to analyze 1. So we modify
it by removing the condition and using parameter α instead of
1.0 in Line 12 2 (see Algorithm 2). When α = 0.5, all edges
(u, z) are assigned with probability 0.5. In RandWalk-mod, we
add a checking for du = 1 (Line 8) to keep the total degree
of G′ equal to that of G, which is missing in RandWalk. Note
that RandWalk-mod accepts selfloops and multiedges.
Let Q be the edge adding matrix defined as
Qij =


0.5 if di = 1 ∧ j is the unique neighbor of i
α if j is the first neighbor of i
0.5di−α
di−1 if j is a neighbor of i but not the first one
0 otherwise.
1It also causes edge miss at t = 2, e.g. a 2-length walk on edge (v3, v2)
(Fig. 1a) causes the selfloop (v3, v3).
2This line causes errors for degree-1 nodes as shown in RandWalk-mod.
We show that RandWalk-mod can be formulated as an
uncertain adjacency matrix ARW = (AP t−1RW ) ◦ (Q + QT ),
where ◦ is the Hadamard product (element-wise). AP t−1RW
is equivalent to computations in lines 2-6 and Q + QT is
equivalent to computations in lines 7-13. We use Q + QT
instead of Q due to the fact that when the edge (u, z) is added
to G′ with probability Quz , the edge (z, u) is also assigned
the same probability. We come up with the following theorem.
Theorem 4.4: RandWalk-mod can be formulated asARW =
(AP t−1RW ) ◦ (Q + QT ). ARW is symmetric. It satisfies the
constraint of unchanged expected degree iff α = 0.5 3.
Proof: By Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2, let B(t)RW be AP t−1RW , we
have symmetric B(t)RW and its row sums are equal to those of
A. Because ARW = B(t)RW ◦ (Q + QT ) and both B(t)RW and
(Q+QT ) are symmetric, ARW is also symmetric.
Due to the fact that (Q+QT ) has the same locations of non-
zeros as B
(t)
RW , the condition of unchanged expected degree is
satisfied if and only if all non-zeros in (Q+QT ) are 1. This
occurs if and only if α = 0.5.
Algorithm 1 RandWalk(G0, t,M ) [10]
Input: undirected graph G0, walk length t and maximum loop count
M
Output: anonymized graph G′
1: G′ = null
2: for u in G0 do
3: count = 1
4: for v in N (u) do
5: loop = 1
6: while (u == z ∨ (u, z) ∈ G′) ∧ (loop ≤M) do
7: perform t− 1 hop random walk from v
8: z is the terminal node of the random walk
9: loop++
10: if loop ≤M then
11: if count == 1 then
12: add (u, z) to G′ with probability 1.0
13: else
14: add (u, z) to G′ with probability 0.5du−1
du−1
15: count ++
return G′
We investigate the limit case when t → ∞ (i.e. P t−1RW →
P∞RW ). Correspondingly B∞RW = AP∞RW has B∞RW (i, j) =
didj
2m . The following theorem quantifies the number of selfloops
and multiedges in B∞RW for power-law (PL) graphs and sparse
Erdo¨s-Renyi (ER) random graphs [11].
Theorem 4.5: For power-law graphs with the exponent γ,
the number of selfloops in B∞RW is
ζ(γ−2)
ζ(γ−1) , where ζ(γ) is the
Riemann zeta function defined only for γ > 1; the number of
multiedges is zero.
For sparse ER random graphs with λ = np constant where
p is the edge probability, the number of selfloops in B∞RW is
λ+ 1; the number of multiedges is zero.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Remark 4.1: We notice that RandWalk-mod can be done
equivalently by the idea in SybilGuard [22]. We first pick a
3This implies a mistake in Theorem 3 of [10]
Algorithm 2 RandWalk-mod(G0, t, α)
Input: undirected graph G0, walk length t and probability α
Output: anonymized graph G′
1: G′ = null
2: for u in G0 do
3: count = 1
4: for v in N (u) do
5: perform t− 1 hop random walk from v
6: z is the terminal node of the random walk
7: if count == 1 then
8: if du == 1 then
9: add (u, z) to G′ with probability 0.5
10: else
11: add (u, z) to G′ with probability α
12: else
13: add (u, z) to G′ with probability 0.5du−α
du−1
14: count ++
return G′
random permutation πu on neighbors of each node u to get du
pairs of (in-edge, out-edge). Then for any walk reaching node
u by the in-edge (v, u), the out-edge is fixed to (u, πu(v)).
In this formulation, it is straightforward to verify that the
transition probability from u to a neighbor v is 1/du(G0).
C. Edge Switching
In edge switching (EdgeSwitch) approaches (Fig. 2b), two
edges (u, v), (w, t) are chosen and switched to (u, t), (w, v)
if aut = awv = 0. This is done in s switches. Using the
switching matrix S, we represent 1-step EdgeSwitch in the
form AS = A (Equation (4)).
The switching matrix S is feasible if and only if auwavt =
0. Note that in the full form, S is n×n matrix with the n− 4
remaining elements on diagonal are 1, other off-diagonal are
0. In general, S is not right stochastic and this happens only
when auw = avt = 0. For s-step EdgeSwitch A
∏s
i=1 Si = A.
If ∀i, Si is right stochastic (i.e. we choose edges (u, v), (w, t)
such that auw = avt = 0), then Lemma 4.1 applies.
D. Direct Construction
Given the deterministic adjacency matrix A, we can directly
construct A that satisfies all three constraints (1),(2) and (3)
in Section IV-A. (k,ǫ)-obf [2] introduces such an approach.
As explained in Section III-B, the expected degrees of nodes
in (k, ǫ)-obf are approximately unchanged due to the fact
that re, re′ are nearly zero by small σ. So (k,ǫ)-obf satisfies
constraints (1) and (2) but it only approximately satisfies the
third constraint.
To remedy this shortcoming, we present the MaxVar ap-
proach in Section V. It adds potential edges to G0, then tries
to find the assignment of edge probabilities such that the
expected node degrees are unchanged while the total variance
is maximized. A comparison among schemes is also shown in
the end of Section V-C.
E. Mixture Approach
In this section, we present the Mixture approach by the
uncertain adjacency matrix Ap parametrized by p, with the
output sample graph Gp. Given the true graph G0 and an
anonymized G ⊑ G, every edge (i, j) is chosen into Gp with
probability Ap(i, j) where
Ap(i, j) =


1 if (i, j) ∈ EG0 ∩EG
1− p if (i, j) ∈ EG0 \EG
p if (i, j) ∈ EG \ EG0
It is straightforward to show that Ap = (1 − p)A(G0) +
pA(G). When applied to G generated by RandWalk-mod with
α = 0.5, we have Ap = (1−p)A+pAP t−1RW = A[(1−p)In+
pP t−1RW ] and Ap satisfies three constraints (1) (2’) and (3).
If there exists Pmix with constraint Pmix(i, j) =
0 if (i, j) /∈ EG0 such that P t−1mix = (1 − p)In + pP t−1RW , then
Mixture can be simulated by the RandWalk-mod approach
with the transition matrix Pmix.
F. Partition Approach
Another approach that can apply to RandWalk-mod, (k, ǫ)-
obf, MaxVar and EdgeSwitch is the Partition approach. Given
true graph G0, this divide-and-conquer strategy first partitions
G0 into disjoint subgraphs sG, then it applies one of the above
anonymization schemes on subgraphs to get anonymized sub-
graphs sG. Finally, it combines sG to obtain G. Note that the
partitioning may cause orphan edges as in MaxVar (Section
V). Those edges must be copied to G to keep node degrees
unchanged.
V. MAXIMUM VARIANCE APPROACH
We start this section with the formulation of MaxVar in the
form of quadratic programming based on two key observa-
tions. Then we describe the anonymization algorithm.
A. Formulation
Two key observations underpinning the MaxVar approach
are presented as follows.
1) Observation #1: Maximum Degree Variance: We ar-
gue that efficient countermeasures against structural attacks
should hinge on node degrees. If a node and its neigh-
bors have their degrees changed, the re-identification risk
is reduced significantly. Consequently, instead of replicating
local structures as in k-anonymity based approaches [24],
[9], [25], [4], [20], [18], we can deviate the attacks by
changing node degrees probabilistically. For example, node
v1 in Fig.1a has degree 2 with probability 1.0 whereas in
Fig.1b, its degree gets four possible values {0, 1, 2, 3} with
probabilities {0.014, 0.188, 0.582, 0.216} respectively. Gener-
ally, given edge probabilities of node u as p1, p2, ..pdu(G),
the degree of u is a sum of independent Bernoulli random
variables, so its expected value is
∑du(G)
i=1 pi and its variance
is
∑du(G)
i=1 pi(1−pi). If we naively target the maximum (local)
degree variance without any constraints, the naive solution
is at pi = 0.5 ∀i. However, such an assignment distorts
graph structure severely and deteriorates the utility. Instead, by
following the model of uncertain adjacency matrix, we have
the constraint
∑du(G)
i=1 pi = du(G0). Note that the minimum


0 1 auw 0
1 0 0 avt
auw 0 0 1
0 avt 1 0




0 −avt 1 avt
−auw 0 auw 1
1 avt 0 −avt
auw 1 −auw 0

 =


0 0 auw 1
0 0 1 avt
auw 1 0 0
1 avt 0 0

 (4)
variance of an uncertain graph is 0 and corresponds to the case
G has all edges being deterministic, e.g. when G = G0 and
in switching-edge based approaches. In the following section,
we show an interesting result relating the total degree variance
with the variance of edit distance.
2) Variance with edit distance: The edit distance between
two deterministic graphs G,G′ is defined as:
D(G,G′) = |EG \ EG′ |+ |EG′ \ EG| (5)
A well-known result about the expected edit distance be-
tween the uncertain graph G and the deterministic graph
G ⊑ G is
E[D(G, G)] =
∑
G′⊑G
Pr(G′)D(G,G′) =
∑
ei∈EG
(1−pi)+
∑
ei /∈EG
pi
Correspondingly, the variance of edit distance is
V ar[D(G, G)] =
∑
G′⊑G
Pr(G′)[D(G,G′)− E[D(G, G)]]2
We prove in the following theorem that the variance of
edit distance is the sum of all edges’ variance (total degree
variance) and it does not depend on the choice of G.
Theorem 5.1: Assume that G(V,E, p) has k uncertain edges
e1, e2, ..., ek and G ⊑ G (i.e. EG ⊆ E). The edit distance
variance is V ar[D(G, G)] = ∑ki=1 pi(1 − pi) and does not
depend on the choice of G.
Proof: See Appendix B.
3) Observation #2: Nearby Potential Edges: As indicated
by Leskovec et al. [8], real graphs reveal two temporal
evolution properties: densification power law and shrinking
diameters. Community Guided Attachment (CGA) model [8],
which produces densifying graphs, is an example of a hierar-
chical graph generation model in which the linkage probability
between nodes decreases as a function of their relative distance
in the hierarchy. With regard to this observation, (k, ǫ)-obf,
by heuristically making potential edges solely based on node
degree discrepancy, produces many inter-community edges.
Shortest-path based statistics will be reduced due to these
edges. MaxVar, in contrast, tries to mitigate the structural
distortion by proposing only nearby potential edges before
assigning edge probabilities. Another evidence is from [19]
where Vazquez analytically proved that Nearest Neighbor
can explain the power-law for degree distribution, clustering
coefficient and average degree among the neighbors. Those
properties are in very good agreement with the observations
made for social graphs. Sala et al. [14] confirmed the consis-
tency of Nearest Neighbor model in their comparative study
on graph models for social networks.
Fig. 3: MaxVar approach
B. Algorithms
This section describes the steps of MaxVar to convert the
input deterministic graph into an uncertain one.
1) Overview: The intuition behind the new approach is to
formulate the perturbation problem as a quadratic program-
ming problem. Given the true graph G0 and the number of
potential edges allowed to be added np, the scheme has three
phases. The first phase tries to partition G0 into s subgraphs,
each one with ns = np/s potential edges connecting nearby
nodes (with default distance 2, i.e. friend-of-friend). The sec-
ond phase formulates a quadratic program for each subgraph
with the constraint of unchanged node degrees to produce
the uncertain subgraphs sG with maximum edge variance.
The third phase combines the uncertain subgraphs sG into
G and publishes several sample graphs. The three phases are
illustrated in Fig. 3.
By keeping the degrees of nodes in the perturbed graph, our
approach is similar to the edge switching approaches (e.g.[21])
but ours is more subtle as we do it implicitly and the switching
occurs not necessarily on pairs of edges.
2) Graph Partitioning: Because of the complexity of ex-
act quadratic programming (Section V-B3), we need a pre-
processing phase to divide the true graph G0 into subgraphs
and run the optimization on each subgraph. Given the number
of subgraphs s, we run METIS 4 to get almost equal-sized
subgraphs with minimum number of inter-subgraph edges.
Each subgraph has ns potential edges added before running
the quadratic program. This phase is outlined in Algorithm 3.
3) Quadratic Programming: By assuming the indepen-
dence of edges, the total degree variance of G = (V,E, p)
for edit distance (Theorem 5.1) is:
V ar(E) =
|E|∑
i=1
pi(1− pi) = |EG0 | −
|E|∑
i=1
p2i (6)
4http://glaros.dtc.umn.edu/gkhome/views/metis
Algorithm 3 Partition-and-Add-Edges
Input: true graph G0 = (V,EG0), number of subgraphs s, number
of potential edges per subgraph ns
Output: list of augmented subgraphs gl
1: gl← METIS(G0, s).
2: for sG in gl do
3: i← 0
4: while i < ns do
5: randomly pick u, v ∈ VsG and (u, v) /∈ EsG with
d(u, v) = 2
6: EsG ← EsG ∪ (u, v)
7: i← i+ 1
return gl
The last equality in (6) is due to the constraint that the ex-
pected node degrees are unchanged (i.e.∑du(G)i=1 pi = du(G0)),
so
∑|E|
i=1 pi is equal to |EG0 |. By targeting the maximum edge
variance, we come up with the following quadratic program.
Minimize
|E|∑
i=1
p2i
Subject to 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1 ∀i∑
v∈N (u)
puv = du(G0) ∀u
The objective function reflects the privacy goal (i.e. sample
graphs do not highly concentrate around the true graph) while
the expected degree constraints aim to preserve the utility.
By dividing the large input graph into subgraphs, we solve
independent quadratic optimization problems. Because each
edge belongs to at most one subgraph and the expected node
degrees in each subgraph are unchanged, it is straightforward
to show that the expected node degrees in G are also un-
changed. We have a proposition on problem feasibility and an
upper bound for the total variance.
Proposition 5.2: The quadratic program in MaxVar is al-
ways feasible. The total variance TVMaxV ar = V ar(E) is
upper bounded by mnpm+np .
Proof: The feasibility is due to the fact that {pe|pe =
1 ∀e ∈ EG0 and pe = 0 otherwise} is a feasible point. Let
ku be the number of potential edges incident to node u.
By requiring u’s expected degree to be unchanged, we have∑
v∈N (u) puv = du. Applying Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we
get
∑
v∈N (u) p
2
uv ≥ 1du+ku (
∑
v∈N (u) puv)
2 =
d2u
du+ku
. Now
we take the sum over all nodes to get the following
V ar(E) = m−
m+np∑
i=1
p2i = m−
1
2
∑
u
∑
v∈N (u)
p2uv
≤ m− 1
2
∑
u
d2u
du + dk
≤ m− 1
2
(
∑
u du)
2∑
u(du + ku)
=
mnp
m+ np
where the last equality is again due to Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality.
C. Comparison of schemes
Table III shows the comparison of schemes we investigate
in this work. Only MaxVar and EdgeSwitch satisfy all three
properties (1),(2) and (3). The next two propositions quantify
the TV of (k, ǫ)-obf and RandWalk-mod.
TABLE III: Comparison of schemes
Scheme Prop #1 Prop #2 Prop #3 Uncertain A
RandWalk-mod ◦ (α = 0.5) × ◦ ◦
RandWalk ◦ ◦ × ◦
EdgeSwitch ◦ ◦ ◦ ×
(k, ǫ)-obf ◦ ◦ × ◦
MaxVar ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Mixture depends on the mixed scheme
Partition depends on the scheme used in subgraphs
Proposition 5.3: The expected total variance of (k, ǫ)-obf
TVobf is (m + np)(E[re] − E[r2e ]). The expressions of
E[re], E[r
2
e ] are given in (7) and (8).
Proof: In (k, ǫ)-obf, m existing edges are assigned
probabilities 1 − re while np potential edges are assigned
probabilities re. Therefore, the total variance is TVobf =
m(1− re)(1− (1− re))+npre(1− re) = (m+np)re(1− re)
where re ← Rσ . Take the expectation of TVobf , we get
E[TVobf ] = (m+ np)(E[re]− E[r2e ]).
Rσ has pdf f(x) = C 1σ√2pi e
−x2/2σ2 if x ∈
[0, 1] and 0 otherwise. The normalization constant
C = 0.5erf(1/σ
√
2) where erf is the error function. Basic
integral computations (change of variable and integration by
parts) give us the formulas for E[re] and E[r2e ] as follows
E[re] =
Cσ√
2π
(1− e−1/2σ2) (7)
E[r2e ] =
Cσ√
2π
(
σ
√
2π
C
− e−1/2σ2) (8)
Note that for σ ≤ 0.1, C ≈ 1 and e−1/2σ2 ≈ 0, so
E[TVobf ] ≈ (m+ np)
(
σ√
2π
− σ2
)
(9)
Proposition 5.4: The total variance of RandWalk-mod
TVRW (t) at walk-length t is upper bounded by m(Kt−m)Kt
where Kt is the number of non-zeros in B(t).
For power-law graphs with the exponent γ, TV PLRW (∞) =
m− 12
[
ζ(γ−2)
ζ(γ−1)
]2
. For sparse ER random graphs with λ = np
constant, TV ERRW (∞) = m− 12 (λ+ 1)2
Proof: The proof uses the same arguments as in Proposi-
tion 5.2 and Theorem 4.5. We omit it due to space limitation.
Note that the Kt increases with t and when t is equal to
the diameter of G, Kt = n2. Therefore, the upper bound of
TVRW (t) converges very fast to m, compatible with the results
in the limit cases of PL and ER random graphs.
VI. QUANTIFYING FRAMEWORK
This section describes a generic framework for privacy and
utility quantification of anonymization methods.
A. Privacy Measurement
We focus on structural re-identification attacks under var-
ious models of attacker’s knowledge as shown in [7]. We
quantify the privacy of an anonymized graph as the sum of
re-identification probabilities of all nodes in the graph. We
differentiate closed-world from open-world adversaries. For
example, when a closed-world adversary knows that Bob has
three neighbors, this fact is exact. An open-world adversary
in this case would learn only that Bob has at least three
neighbors. We consider the result of structural query Q on
a node u as the node signature sigQ(u). Given a query Q,
nodes having the same signatures form an equivalence class.
So given the true graph G0 and an output anonymized graph
G∗, the privacy is measured as in the following example.
Example 6.1: Assuming that we have signatures of G0
and signatures of G∗ as in Table IV, the re-identification
probabilities in G∗ of nodes 1,2 are 13 , of nodes 4,8 are
1
2 , of nodes 3,5,6,7 are 0s. And the privacy score of G
∗ is
1
3 +
1
3 +
1
2 +
1
2 + 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 = 1.66. In G0, the privacy
score is 13 +
1
3 +
1
3 +
1
2 +
1
2 +
1
3 +
1
3 +
1
3 = 3, equal to the
number of equivalence classes.
TABLE IV: Example of node signatures
Graph Equivalence classes
G0 s1{1, 2, 3}, s2{4, 5}, s3{6, 7, 8}
G∗ s1{1, 2, 6}, s2{4, 7}, s3{3, 8}, s4{5}
We consider two privacy scores in this paper.
• H1 score uses node degree as the node signature, i.e.
we assume that the attacker know apriori degrees of all
nodes.
• H2open uses the set (not multiset) of degrees of node’s
friends as the node signature. For example, if a node
has 6 neighbors and the degrees of those neighbors are
{1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 5}, then its signature for H2open attack is
{1, 2, 3, 5}.
Higher-order scores like H2 (exact multiset of neighbors’
degrees) or H3 (exact multiset of neighbor-of-neighbors’ de-
grees) induce much higher privacy scores of the true graph G0
(in the order of |V |) and represent less meaningful metrics for
privacy. The following proposition claims the automorphism-
invariant property of structural privacy scores.
Proposition 6.1: All privacy scores based on structural
queries [7] are automorphism-invariant, i.e. if we find a non-
trivial automorphism G1 of G0, the signatures of all nodes in
G1 are unchanged.
Proof: The proof is trivially based on the definition of
graph automorphism. We omit it due to the lack of space.
B. Utility Measurement
Following [2] and [21], we consider three groups of statis-
tics for utility measurement: degree-based statistics, shortest-
path based statistics and clustering statistics.
1) Degree-based statistics:
• Number of edges: SNE = 12
∑
v∈V dv
• Average degree: SAD = 1n
∑
v∈V dv
• Maximal degree: SMD = maxv∈V dv
• Degree variance: SDV = 1n
∑
v∈V (dv − SAD)2
• Power-law exponent of degree sequence: SPL is the
estimate of γ assuming the degree sequence follows a
power-law ∆(d) ∼ d−γ
2) Shortest path-based statistics:
• Average distance: SAPD is the average distance among
all pairs of vertices that are path-connected.
• Effective diameter: SEDiam is the 90-th percentile dis-
tance among all path-connected pairs of vertices.
• Connectivity length: SCL is defined as the harmonic
mean of all pairwise distances in the graph.
• Diameter : SDiam is the maximum distance among all
path-connected pairs of vertices.
3) Clustering statistics:
• Clustering coefficient: SCC = 3N∆N3 where N∆ is the
number of triangles and N3 is the number of connected
triples.
All of the above statistics are computed on sample graphs
generated from the uncertain output G. In particular, to es-
timate shortest-path based measures, we use Approximate
Neighbourhood Function (ANF) [12]. The diameter is lower
bounded by the longest distance among all-destination bread-
first-searches from 1,000 randomly chosen nodes.
VII. EVALUATION
In this section, our evaluation aims to show the disadvan-
tages of (k, ǫ)-obf and RandWalk/RandWalk-mod as well as
the gap between them. We then illustrate the effectiveness and
efficiency of the gap-filling approaches MaxVar and Mixture.
The effectiveness is measured by privacy scores (lower is
better) and the relative error of utility (lower is better). The
efficiency is measured by the running time. All algorithms are
implemented in Python and run on a desktop PC with Intelr
Core i7-4770@ 3.4Ghz, 16GB memory. We use MOSEK5 as
the quadratic solver.
Three large real-world datasets are used in our experiments
6
. dblp is a co-authorship network where two authors are
connected if they publish at least one paper together. amazon
is a product co-purchasing network where the graph contains
an undirected edge from i to j if a product i is frequently co-
purchased with product j. youtube is a video-sharing web
site that includes a social network. The graph sizes (|V |, |E|)
of dblp, amazon and youtube are (317080, 1049866),
(334863, 925872) and (1134890, 2987624) respectively. We
partition dblp, amazon into 20 subgraphs and youtube
into 60 subgraphs. The sample size of each test case is 20.
5http://mosek.com/
6http://snap.stanford.edu/data/index.html
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A. (k, ǫ)-obf and RandWalk
We report the performance of (k, ǫ)-obf in Table V. We keep
the number of potential edges equal to m (default value in
[2]) and vary σ. We find that the scheme achieves low relative
errors only at small σ. However, privacy scores, especially
H2open, rise fast (up to 50% compared to the true graph).
This fact incurs high privacy-utility tradeoff as confirmed in
Table VIII.
Table VI shows the performance similarity between Rand-
Walk and RandWalk-mod except the case of youtube and for
t = 2 in amazon. Because RandWalk-mod satisfies the third
constraint, it benefits several degree-based statistics while the
existence of selfloops and multiedges does not impact much on
shortest-path based metrics. RandWalk misses a lot of edges
at t = 2 (see footnote 1 in Section IV-B). The remarkable
characteristics of random-walk schemes are the very low
privacy scores and the high relative errors (lower-bounded
around 8 to 10%). Clearly, there is a gap between high
tradeoffs in (k, ǫ)-obf and high relative errors in RandWalk
where MaxVar and Mixture may play their roles.
B. Effectiveness of MaxVar
We assess privacy and utility of MaxVar by varying the
number of potential edges np. The results are shown in Table
VII. As for privacy scores, if we increase np, we gain better
privacy as we allow more edge switches. Due to the expected
degree constraints in the quadratic program, all degree-based
metrics vary only a little.
We observe the near linear relationships between H1,
rel.err and the number of replaced edges |EG0 \ EG| in
Figures 4, 6 and near quadratic relationship of H2open against
|EG0 \ EG| in Fig.5. The ratio of replaced edges in Figures
4,5 and 6 is defined as |EG0\EG||EG0 | .
The runtime of MaxVar consists of time for (1) partitioning
G0, (2) adding friend-of-friend edges to subgraphs, (3) solving
quadratic subproblems and (4) combining uncertain subgraphs
to get G. We report the runtime in Fig.7. As we can see,
the total runtime is in several minutes and the runtime of the
partitioning step is almost negligible. Increasing np gives rise
to the runtime in steps 2,3 and 4 and the trends are nearly
linear. The runtime on youtube is three times longer than
on the other two datasets, almost linear to their data sizes.
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C. Comparative Evaluation
Table VIII shows comparisons between MaxVar, (k, ǫ)-
obf and RandWalk/RandWalk-mod. The column tradeoff is√
H2open× rel.err as we conjecture the quadratic and linear
behavior of H2open and rel.err respectively (Figures 5 and
6). We omit the column H1×rel.err because they are almost
equal for all schemes considered in this work. Clearly, MaxVar
gains better privacy-utility tradeoffs than (k, ǫ)-obf, but worse
than RandWalk, RandWalk-mod. However, MaxVar has its own
merit as a gap-filling solution. Figures 8,9 and 10 show that
while RandWalk, RandWalk-mod have the best tradeoffs, they
suffer from high lower bounds for utility. In other words, if
the dataset allows higher privacy risk for better utility (lower
rel.err) then the usage of two random walk based solutions may
be limited. The simple solution Mixture also fills the gap. We
omit EdgeSwitch due to its worst tradeoffs.
In addition to the re-identification scores H1 and H2open,
we also compute ǫ for k ∈ {30, 50, 100} to have a fair
comparison with (k, ǫ)-obf. Table VIII shows that MaxVar has
the best (k, ǫ) scores. The number of potential edges used in
MaxVar could be 20% of |EG0 |, much less than that of (k, ǫ)-
obf (100% for c = 2 [2]). MaxVar and RandWalk/RandWalk-
mod have |EG0 \EG| ≃ |EG \EG0 | and these two quantities
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TABLE V: (k, ǫ)-obf
σ H1 H2open SNE SAD SMD SDV SCC SPL SAPD SED SCL SDiam rel.err
dblp 199 125302 1049866 6.62 343 100.15 0.306 2.245 7.69 9 7.46 20
0.001 72.9 40712.1 1048153 6.61 316.0 97.46 0.303 2.244 7.74 9.4 7.50 20.0 0.018
0.01 41.1 24618.2 1035994 6.53 186.0 86.47 0.294 2.248 7.82 9.5 7.59 19.8 0.077
0.1 19.7 7771.4 991498 6.25 164.9 64.20 0.284 2.265 8.08 10.0 7.85 20.0 0.128
amazon 153 113338 925872 5.53 549 33.20 0.205 2.336 12.75 16 12.10 44
0.001 55.7 55655.9 924321 5.52 479.1 31.73 0.206 2.340 12.14 15.2 11.65 33.2 0.057
0.01 34.5 39689.8 915711 5.47 299.7 27.18 0.220 2.348 12.40 15.6 11.91 32.4 0.101
0.1 19.2 16375.4 892140 5.33 253.9 21.87 0.232 2.374 12.52 15.5 12.06 31.4 0.144
youtube 978 321724 2987624 5.27 28754 2576.0 0.0062 2.429 6.07 8 6.79 20
0.001 157.2 36744.6 2982974 5.26 28438 2522.6 0.0062 2.416 6.24 8.0 6.01 19.5 0.022
0.01 80.0 22361.7 2940310 5.18 26900 2282.6 0.0061 2.419 6.27 8.0 6.04 19.0 0.043
0.1 23.4 5806.9 2624066 4.62 16353 970.8 0.0070 2.438 6.59 8.1 6.36 20.4 0.160
TABLE VI: RandWalk and RandWalk-mod
t H1 H2open SNE SAD SMD SDV SCC SPL SAPD SED SCL SDiam rel.err
dblp 199 125302 1049866 6.62 343 100.15 0.306 2.245 7.69 9 7.46 20
(RW) 2 10.0 4.9 1001252 6.32 309.3 86.16 0.152 2.197 7.43 9.1 7.20 19.7 0.094
3 11.8 10.9 1048129 6.61 315.4 98.04 0.107 2.155 7.08 8.7 6.88 17.8 0.110
5 11.7 5.6 1049484 6.62 321.6 100.77 0.065 2.148 6.79 8.0 6.62 16.4 0.142
10 11.9 2.9 1049329 6.62 329.2 103.06 0.030 2.144 6.54 8.0 6.40 14.3 0.171
(RW-mod) 2 11.8 4.5 1049921 6.62 327.0 105.3 0.093 2.110 7.75 9.7 7.48 23.0 0.109
3 11.9 9.4 1049877 6.62 343.3 105.1 0.071 2.117 7.32 9.0 7.10 20.4 0.099
5 12.0 5.4 1049781 6.62 340.5 105.1 0.044 2.115 6.95 8.4 6.76 18.3 0.131
10 11.9 2.6 1049902 6.62 340.0 105.3 0.021 2.116 6.59 8.0 6.44 16.0 0.164
amazon 153 113338 925872 5.53 549 33.20 0.205 2.336 12.75 16 12.10 44
(RW) 2 5.7 5.4 861896 5.15 274.9 23.11 0.148 2.337 10.70 13.8 10.19 38.7 0.180
3 10.0 16.5 923793 5.52 495.6 32.72 0.113 2.282 10.33 13.1 9.87 34.1 0.137
5 10.4 8.6 925185 5.53 507.7 33.52 0.080 2.276 9.45 12.1 9.07 29.6 0.181
10 10.2 4.6 925748 5.53 498.1 34.37 0.046 2.273 8.55 10.5 8.25 25.7 0.234
(RW-mod) 2 9.8 3.2 925672 5.53 255.1 37.61 0.099 2.246 12.02 15.5 11.40 43.2 0.139
3 9.9 11.2 925532 5.53 535.3 37.32 0.082 2.254 10.89 14.0 10.38 37.9 0.134
5 9.7 6.0 926163 5.53 522.8 37.42 0.059 2.252 9.83 12.5 9.40 33.0 0.185
10 9.9 3.3 925809 5.53 491.4 37.45 0.035 2.251 8.76 11.0 8.44 28.7 0.238
youtube 978 321724 2987624 5.27 28754 2576.0 0.0062 2.429 6.07 8 6.79 20
(RW) 2 13.4 1.5 2636508 4.65 19253.8 1139.7 0.022 2.191 6.18 7.9 5.93 23.5 0.403
3 23.8 17.6 2982204 5.26 26803.6 2389.6 0.004 2.108 5.73 7.0 5.52 18.0 0.103
5 24.6 8.4 2985967 5.26 26018.7 2340.0 0.005 2.106 5.55 7.0 5.38 16.3 0.120
10 21.9 1.8 2984115 5.26 24695.8 2099.4 0.009 2.100 5.49 6.9 5.33 18.7 0.145
(RW-mod) 2 26.4 1.4 2987228 5.26 23829.7 2578.5 0.018 2.053 6.27 8.0 6.02 22.1 0.245
3 26.9 22.3 2988011 5.27 28611.5 2579.7 0.005 2.077 5.75 7.2 5.54 19.0 0.081
5 26.1 11.0 2987479 5.26 28619.3 2581.4 0.005 2.076 5.61 7.0 5.44 18.3 0.090
10 26.3 1.7 2987475 5.26 28432.2 2579.9 0.008 2.073 5.58 7.0 5.41 18.8 0.099
are higher than those of (k, ǫ)-obf where the number of edges
is preserved only at small σ. RandWalk and RandWalk-mod do
not have many edges preserved due to their rewiring nature.
|EG0 \ EG| increases slowly in MaxVar because the edges
in G0 always have positive probabilities. Fig 11 compares
the normalized total variance (i.e. divided by |EG0 |) of three
schemes. Again, MaxVar is between (k, ǫ)-obf and RandWalk-
mod.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We provide a generalized view of graph anonymization
based on the semantics of edge uncertainty. Via the model of
uncertain adjacency matrix with the constraint of unchanged
expected degree for all nodes, we analyze recently proposed
schemes and explain why there exists a gap between them
by comparing the total degree variance. We propose MaxVar,
a novel anonymization scheme exploiting two key observa-
tions: maximizing the total degree variance while keeping the
expected degrees of all nodes unchanged and using nearby
potential edges. We also investigate an elegant Mixture ap-
proach that together with MaxVar fill the gap between (k, e)-
obf and RandWalk. Furthermore, we promote the usage of
incorrectness measure for privacy assessment in a new quanti-
fying framework rather than Shannon entropy and min-entropy
(k-anonymity). The experiments demonstrate the effectiveness
of our methods. Our work may incite several directions for
future research including (1) novel constructions of uncertain
graphs based on the uncertain adjacency matrix (2) deeper
analysis on the privacy-utility relationships in MaxVar (e.g.
TABLE VII: Effectiveness of MaxVar (k denotes one thousand)
np H1 H2open SNE SAD SMD SDV SCC SPL SAPD SED SCL SDiam rel.err
dblp 199 125302 1049866 6.62 343 100.15 0.306 2.245 7.69 9 7.46 20
200k 59.7 3257.2 1049774 6.62 342.3 100.73 0.279 2.213 7.66 9.3 7.43 19.5 0.017
400k 40.7 744.0 1049813 6.62 343.5 101.26 0.255 2.189 7.56 9.1 7.33 18.9 0.030
600k 32.1 325.7 1050066 6.62 343.4 101.73 0.235 2.173 7.46 9.0 7.25 17.7 0.045
800k 29.5 199.2 1049869 6.62 345.9 102.07 0.219 2.163 7.45 9.0 7.24 17.0 0.056
1000k 27.0 140.7 1049849 6.62 345.4 102.29 0.205 2.155 7.34 9.0 7.15 17.0 0.064
amazon 153 113338 925872 5.53 549 33.20 0.205 2.336 12.75 16 12.10 44
200k 30.2 2209.1 925831 5.53 551.5 33.83 0.197 2.321 12.38 16.1 11.72 40.5 0.022
400k 22.8 452.4 925928 5.53 550.2 34.40 0.182 2.306 11.88 15.3 11.28 37.1 0.050
600k 17.8 188.4 925802 5.53 543.9 34.79 0.167 2.296 11.60 15.0 11.04 36.9 0.066
800k 17.2 118.8 925660 5.53 550.0 35.11 0.154 2.289 11.33 14.4 10.81 34.5 0.087
1000k 15.2 82.4 925950 5.53 551.8 35.43 0.142 2.282 11.13 14.1 10.62 31.8 0.105
youtube 978 321724 2987624 5.27 28754 2576.0 0.0062 2.429 6.07 8 6.79 20
600k 114.4 4428.8 2987898 5.27 28759 2576 0.0065 2.373 6.19 7.8 5.97 18.6 0.030
1200k 84.2 1419.2 2987342 5.26 28754 2576 0.0064 2.319 6.02 7.2 5.82 17.9 0.042
1800k 71.4 814.4 2987706 5.27 28745 2577 0.0062 2.287 5.97 7.1 5.78 17.2 0.049
2400k 65.3 595.5 2987468 5.26 28749 2577 0.0060 2.265 5.96 7.1 5.77 16.6 0.056
3000k 62.8 513.7 2987771 5.27 28761 2578 0.0058 2.251 5.89 7.1 5.71 16.4 0.062
explaining the near linear and near quadratic curves) (3) study
on directed and bipartite graphs.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of theorem 4.5
Proof: For power-law graphs, the node degree distribution
is P (k) = k
−γ
ζ(γ) . The number of selfloops n
PL
sl in B∞RW is the
sum of elements on the main diagonal.
nPLsl =
1
2m
n∑
i=1
d2i =
1
2m
∞∑
k=1
k2nP (k) =
n
nE(k)
∞∑
k=1
k2P (k)
=
1
E(k)
∞∑
k=1
k−(γ−2)
ζ(γ)
=
ζ(γ)
ζ(γ − 1)
ζ(γ − 2)
ζ(γ)
=
ζ(γ − 2)
ζ(γ − 1)
To prove that there is no multiedge in B∞RW we show that
all elements in B∞RW are less than 1. This is equivalent to
show dmax <
√
2m. We use the constraint that the number of
TABLE VIII: MaxVar vs. (k, ǫ)-obf, RandWalk and RandWalk-mod (lower tradeoff is better)
PRIVACY UTILITY
graph H1 H2open |EG0 \EG| |EG \EG0 | ǫ(k = 30) ǫ(k = 50) ǫ(k = 100) rel.err tradeoff
dblp 199 125302 0.00238 0.00393 0.00694
σ = 0.001 72.9 40712.1 6993.0 5280.2 0.00039 0.00122 0.00435 0.018 3.61
σ = 0.01 41.1 24618.2 19317.3 5444.9 0.00051 0.00062 0.00082 0.077 12.03
σ = 0.1 19.7 7771.4 65285.1 6916.8 0.00179 0.00199 0.00245 0.128 11.33
(MV) np = 200k 59.7 3257.2 94508.0 94416.5 0.00033 0.00077 0.00152 0.017 0.99
(MV) np = 600k 32.1 325.7 246155.6 246355.3 0.00017 0.00029 0.00085 0.045 0.82
(RW) t = 2 10.0 4.9 615966.2 567352.2 0.00318 0.00439 0.00789 0.094 0.21
(RW) t = 5 11.7 5.6 754178.1 753796.3 0.00271 0.00386 0.00689 0.142 0.34
(RW-mod) t = 2 11.8 4.5 719361.2 719416.5 0.00073 0.00135 0.00252 0.109 0.23
(RW-mod) t = 5 12.0 5.4 784872.3 784786.8 0.00057 0.00113 0.00228 0.131 0.30
amazon 153 113338 0.00151 0.00218 0.00456
σ = 0.001 55.7 55655.9 6158.9 4607.4 0.00048 0.00119 0.00293 0.065 13.40
σ = 0.01 34.5 39689.8 14962.0 4801.3 0.00038 0.00052 0.00066 0.114 21.33
σ = 0.1 19.2 16375.4 39382.6 5650.3 0.00068 0.00102 0.00190 0.145 18.46
(MV) np = 200k 30.2 2209.1 104800.9 104759.9 0.00023 0.00032 0.00065 0.022 1.03
(MV) np = 600k 17.8 188.4 266603.7 266533.7 0.00015 0.00023 0.00047 0.066 0.91
(RW) t = 2 5.7 5.4 649001.0 585025.5 0.00213 0.00338 0.00550 0.180 0.42
(RW) t = 5 10.4 8.6 629961.8 629274.9 0.00146 0.00239 0.00423 0.181 0.53
(RW-mod) t = 2 9.8 3.2 725440.1 725239.9 0.00048 0.00073 0.00133 0.139 0.25
(RW-mod) t = 5 9.7 6.0 671694.2 671985.4 0.00038 0.00058 0.00137 0.185 0.45
youtube 978 321724 0.00291 0.00402 0.00583
σ = 0.001 157.2 36744.6 19678.5 15028.5 0.00143 0.00232 0.00421 0.022 4.28
σ = 0.01 80.0 22361.7 62228.6 14914.3 0.00060 0.00105 0.00232 0.043 6.38
σ = 0.1 23.4 5806.9 378566.0 15007.5 0.00038 0.00052 0.00074 0.160 12.20
(MV) np = 600k 114.4 4428.8 213097.3 213371.4 0.00047 0.00063 0.00108 0.030 2.00
(MV) np = 1800k 71.4 814.4 521709.9 521791.6 0.00040 0.00052 0.00090 0.049 1.38
(RW) t = 2 13.4 1.5 2836169.3 2485053.4 0.00319 0.00425 0.00623 0.403 0.50
(RW) t = 5 24.6 8.4 2468068.6 2466411.3 0.00304 0.00408 0.00598 0.120 0.35
(RW-mod) t = 2 26.4 1.4 2863112.1 2862716.3 0.00159 0.00226 0.00355 0.245 0.29
(RW-mod) t = 5 26.1 11.0 2467414.9 2467269.5 0.00153 0.00322 0.00159 0.090 0.30
nodes with degree dmax must be at least 1, i.e. nd
−γ
max
ζ(γ) ≥ 1↔
dmax ≤ (n/ζ(γ))1/γ . Because ζ(γ) > 1 and we consider γ >
2 in social networks, (n/ζ(γ))1/γ <
√
n. Meanwhile,
√
2m =√
n ζ(γ−1)ζ(γ) >
√
n due to the fact that ζ(γ) is monotonically
decreasing. So we conclude nPLme = 0.
For sparse ER random graphs, we have P (k) → e−λ λkk! .
The number of selfloops nERsl is
nERsl =
1
2m
n∑
i=1
d2i =
1
2m
∞∑
k=1
k2nP (k) =
n
nE(k)
∞∑
k=1
k2P (k)
=
1
λ
E(k2) =
1
λ
(E(k)2 + V ar(k)) =
1
λ
(λ2 + λ) = λ+ 1
Similar to the case of PL graphs, we show that dmax <
√
2m
where dmax = maxk ne−λ λ
k
k! ≥ 1 = maxk k!λk ≤ ne−λ.
Using the basic facts kk/2 ≤ k! and k > λ we get
kk/2
λk ≤ ne−λ < n, so k < n2/kλ2 <
√
nλ =
√
2m as long as
n is sufficiently large and λ ≥ 4. So we conclude nERme = 0.
B. Proof of theorem 5.1
Proof: We prove the result by induction.
When k = 1, we have two cases of G1: EG1 = {e1} and
EG1 = ∅. For both cases, V ar[D(G1, G1)] = p1(1− p1), i.e.
independent of G1.
Assume that the result is correct up to k − 1 edges, i.e.
V ar[D(Gk−1, Gk−1)] =
∑k−1
i=1 pi(1 − pi) for all Gk−1 ⊑
Gk−1, we need to prove that it is also correct for k edges.
We use the subscript notations Gk, Gk for the case of k edges.
We consider two cases of Gk: ek ∈ Gk and ek /∈ Gk.
Case 1. The formula for V ar[D(Gk, Gk)] is
V ar[D(Gk, Gk)] =
∑
G′k⊑Gk
Pr(G′k)[D(G
′
k, Gk)−E[D(Gk, Gk)]]2
=
∑
ek∈G′k
Pr(G′k)[Dk−E[Dk]]2+
∑
ek /∈G′k
Pr(G′k)[Dk−E[Dk]]2
The first sum is
∑
G′
k−1
⊑Gk−1 pkPr(G
′
k−1)[Dk−1 −
E[Dk−1]− (1− pk)]2.
The second sum is
∑
G′k−1⊑Gk−1(1−pk)Pr(G
′
k−1)[Dk−1−
E[Dk−1] + pk)]2.
Here we use shortened notations Dk for D(G′k, Gk) and
E[Dk] for E[D(Gk, Gk)].
By simple algebra, we have V ar[D(Gk, Gk)] =
V ar[D(Gk−1, Gk−1)] + qk(1− qk) =
∑k
i=1 pi(1 − pi).
Case 2. similar to the Case 1.
